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Abstract
We present a simple regularisation of Adversarial Perturba-
tions based upon the perceptual loss. While the resulting
perturbations remain imperceptible to the human eye, they
differ from existing adversarial perturbations in two impor-
tant regards: (i) our resulting perturbations are semi-sparse,
and typically make alterations to objects and regions of in-
terest leaving the background static; (ii) our perturbations
do not alter the distribution of data in the image and are un-
detectable by state-of-the art-methods. As such this work
reinforces the connection between explainable AI and ad-
versarial perturbations.
We show the merits of our approach by evaluating on
standard explainablity benchmarks and by defeating recent
tests for detecting adversarial perturbations, substantially
decreasing the effectiveness of detecting adversarial pertur-
bations.
1 Introduction
Adversarial Perturbations [50] refers to the small alteration
of a data point or image leading to a substantial change in
classification response. Despite drastically changing the re-
sponse of a machine learning classifier, such perturbations
are often imperceptible to humans. As such, the mismatch
between how computers respond to adversarial perturbed
images and how people respond pose severe challenges
when deploying life altering decision making systems in the
real world, with notable examples in driverless cars [12];
weapon detection [2]; and person re-identification [10].
Two compelling arguments for the existence of adversar-
ial perturbations in images have been offered. The first due
to Goodfellow [17] remarks that adversarial perturbations
are simply an artefact of a high-dimensional space, and it
is entirely expected a small perturbations to every pixel in
the image can add up to a large change in the classifier re-
sponse, and that in fact the same behaviour is found in linear
classifiers.
A second argument attempts to understand why sparse
(and potentially even single pixel) attacks exist; and at-
tributes their effectiveness to exploding gradients. Explod-
ing gradients refers to how changes in functional response
can grow exponentially with the depth of the network, and
this is an issue known to plague the learning of Recurrent
Neural Networks [31], and the very deep networks common
to computer vision.
This phenomena occurs because, by construction, neu-
ral networks form a product of (convolutional) matrix
operations interlaced with non-linearities; and for direc-
tions/locations in which these non-linearities act approxi-
mately linearly, the eigenvalues of the Jacobian can grow
exponentially with depth (see [31] for a formal derivation).
While this phenomena is well-studied in the context of
training networks, with remedies being offered in the form
of normalisation [21] or gradient clipping [31], the same
phenomena can occur when generating adversarial pertur-
bations. This means that a carefully chosen and small per-
turbation can have an extremely large effect in the response
of a deep classifier.
To understand how these arguments fit together, and
which of these explanations accounts for the familiar be-
haviour of adversarial perturbations, we propose a simple
novel regularisation that bounds the exponential growth of
the classifier response by regularising the perceptual dis-
tance [22] between the original image and its adversarial
perturbation.
One common criticism of adversarial perturbations is
that the generated images lie outside the manifold of nat-
ural images, and that if we could directly sample from the
manifold of images, our adversarial perturbations would be
both larger and more representative of the real world. Re-
stricting adversarial perturbations to the manifold of natural
images should limit the impact of exploding gradients – if
samples are drawn from this space then a well-trained clas-
sifier should implicitly reflect the smoothness of the true
labels of the underlying data distribution.
However, characterising the manifold of natural im-
ages outside of handwritten digits has proven extremely
challenging1. Our approach provides a complementary
lightweight alternative. Rather than attempting to charac-
1See discussion in the experimental section of [48].
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Figure 1: Explaining Images. From left to right: (i) The original image; (ii) The original image plus the adversarial pertur-
bation (Indistinguishable from (i)); (iii) The interest map (per pixel magnitude of the adversarial perturbations) renormalised
to be visible, highlighting salient objects in the image. (iv) The dominant connected component and the resulting bounding
box from automatic object detection.
terise the manifold of images, we restrict the benefit of ex-
ploding gradients that drives algorithms searching for min-
imal adversarial perturbations to step off the manifold.
We propose a novel regularisation for adversarial per-
turbations based around the perceptual loss. Our new per-
turbations have unexpected properties, tending to highlight
objects and regions of interest within the image (see figure
1). Moreover, they have different statistics to some existing
adversarial perturbations allowing us to bypass an existing
approach for adversarial perturbation detection. We evalu-
ate on standard explainability dataset for image classifiers.
2 Prior work
Numerous approaches to adversarial perturbations have
been proposed in the past. These can loosely be divided
into white-box[29, 8, 5, 28] approaches that assume access
to the underlying nature of the model and black-box meth-
ods which do not[30, 25]. The search for an adversarial
perturbation is often formulated as trying to find the closest
point to a particular image, under the `∞, `1 or `2 norm that
takes a different class label to this particular image.
Also of interest are other works that add additional con-
straints to the perturbation to try to make the generated im-
ages more plausible. Such works may restrict the space
of perturbations considered by trying to find an adversarial
perturbations that confounds many classifiers at once [11],
or is robust to image warps[2]. Other approaches consider
only a single image and single classifier, but restricted ad-
versarial perturbations to lie on the manifold of plausible
images [48, 16, 40, 44]. The principle limitation to this ap-
proach is that as a minimal first step it requires a plausible
generator of natural images, something that is achievable
with small simple datasets such as MNIST but currently out
of reach for even the 224 by 244 thumbnails used by typical
ImageNet [37] classifiers.
Adversarial Perturbations and Counterfactuals There
has been substantial work relating the generation of adver-
sarial perturbations and counterfactual explanations. This
relationship follows from the definitions in philosophy and
folk psychology of a counterfactual explanation as answer-
ing the question “What would need to be different in order
for outcome A to have occurred instead of B?”. With full
causal models of images being outside our grasp, such ques-
tions are commonly answered using Lewis’s Closest Pos-
sible World semantics[24], rather than Pearl’s Structured
Causal Models [32]. Under Lewis’s framework an expla-
nation for why an image is classified as ‘dog’ rather than
‘cat’ can be found by searching for the most similar pos-
sible world (i.e. image) to which the classifier assigns the
label ‘cat’.
Conceptually, this is no different to searching for an ad-
versarial perturbation sampled from the space of possible
images. Several approaches have been proposed that either
bypass the requirement that the counterfactual is an image,
and return text descriptions [20], naı¨vely ignore the require-
ment that the world is plausible[53], used prototypes[51],
or auto-encoders [9] to characterise the manifold of plausi-
ble images, or require large edits that replace regions of the
image, either with the output of GANs [6] or with patches
sampled from other images [18].
Adversarial Perturbations and Gradient Methods The
majority of methods in the explainability of computer vi-
sion tend to be gradient or importance based methods that
assign an importance weight to every pixel in the image;
every super-pixel; or to mid-level neurons. These gradient
methods and adversarial perturbations are strongly related.
In fact, with most modern networks being piecewise linear,
if the found adversarial perturbation and the original image
lie on the same linear piece, the difference between the orig-
inal image, and closest adversarial perturbations under the
2
Figure 2: More focused Adversarial Perturbations. From left to right: (i) The original Image. (ii) An `2 perturbed image
found using Deepfool and minimising equation (3). (iii) A perceptually perturbed image minimising (4). As described in the
text, the use of the perceptual loss results in more focused alterations in cluttered scenes.
`2 norm is equivalent to the direction of steepest descent,
up to scaling. As such, `2 adversarial perturbations can be
thought of as a slightly robustified method of estimating the
gradient, that takes into account some local non-linearities.
Perturbation methods look over a larger range to esti-
mate long-range gradient-like responses including [56] who
applied constant-value occlusion masks to different input
patches repeatedly to find regions that changed the most.
LIME [35] constructed a linear model using the responses
obtained from the perturbing super-pixels. In more re-
cent works, Extremal Perturbation [14] identifies an optimal
fixed mask of the image to occlude that gives the maximal
effect on the networks output.
Of the pure gradient based approaches [41] - calculates
the gradient of the output with respect to the input to create
a saliency map giving fine grained, but potentially less in-
terpretable results. Other gradient based approach includes
SmoothGrad [43] which stabilises the saliency maps by av-
eraging over multiple noisy copy of them and Integrated
Gradients[49] where an attribution score is calculated by
accumulating gradient when perturbing an empty image to
the input image.
The CAM based approaches [59, 38] sum the activa-
tion maps in the final convolutional layer of the network.
These small activation maps are then up-sampled to obtain
a heatmap that highlights particularly salient regions. Grad-
CAM is a generalised variant which finds similar regions of
interest to the perturbation based approaches [38].
A number of experiments were developed to test saliency
methods including the pointing game [33, 57, 38], the
weakly supervised object localisation task [15, 7] and the
insertion and deletion game [33, 54]. In particular, [1]
developed experiments to test saliency methods suitabil-
ity. These experiments had been applied on a number
of existing saliency techniques including; Gradient[41],
SmoothGrad[43], GuidedBackprop[47], Integrated Gradi-
ents [49], GradientInput[39] and GradCAM [38].
Detecting Adversarial Perturbations Two main schools
of thought for defending against adversarial perturbations
exist. Either classifiers can be strengthen to resist the adver-
sarial perturbations [30, 55, 52], or adversarial perturbations
can be detected directly [4] and excluded.
Multiple different detection approaches exist, a good
review (and subsequent rebuttal) of several different de-
tection approaches can be found in [4] which covers ap-
proaches such as: adding additional classes to a classi-
fier [19]; utilising additional classifiers e.g. [27]; density es-
timates e.g. [13]; eigen-decompositions[58] and a variety of
others. Other interesting approaches utilises the generative
models of images to detect adversarial examples e.g. [44].
Of particular interest to this paper, are approaches that
use layers or mid-level responses of the classifier to iden-
tify adversarial perturbations, as we regularise these layer
through our perceptual loss. One such approach is [27]
who added small neural networks to detect the perturbation
on the value of various layers. Another is [46] who con-
structed statistics based on finding subsets of neurons in a
given layer with unusual values. Finally, many detection
methods can be fooled by constructing losses that explicitly
account for the method used to detect the perturbations [4].
3 Methodology
We consider a standard multi-class classifier C(·) as that
takes an image x as input, and returns a k dimensional vec-
tor consisting of the confidence the classifier assigns to each
one of k classes. And we say the classifier C(·) assigns the
class l = argmaxj Cj(x) to the image x.
Given an image x classified as label i we consider the
multi-class margin:
Mi(x
′) = Ci(x′)−max
j 6=i
Cj(x
′) (1)
and note thatMi(x′) ≤ 0 if and only if C(·) does not assign
label i to image x. As such an adversarial perturbation x′
3
Figure 3: Perceptual Perturbations as Explanations. See dis-
cussion in section 4.
can be found by minimising
(Mi(x
′)− T )2 (2)
where T is a small target value greater than zero. It is well-
known [45] that minimising a loss of the form:
(Mi(x
′)− T )2 + λ||x′ − x||22 (3)
is equivalent to finding a minimiser of (Mi(x′) − T )2 sub-
ject to the requirement that x′ lies in the ball defined by
||x− x′||22 ≤ ρ for some ρ. As such minimising this objec-
tive for an appropriate value of λ and T is a good strategy
for finding adversarial perturbations of image x with small
`2 norm.
Writing C(l)(x) for the classifier response of in the lth
layer of the neural net, we consider the related loss
(Mi(x
′)− T )2+λ′
∑
l∈L
||C(l)(x)′−C(l)(x)||22+λ||x′−x||22
(4)
defined over a set of layers of the neural net L.
The second half of this objective is the perceptual loss
of [22], and minimising this objective is equivalent to find-
ing a minimiser of (3) subject to the requirement that x′ lies
in the ball defined by
∑
l∈L ||C(l)(x)− C(l)(x)′||22 ≤ ρ.
Some care needs to be taken in selecting the layers L of
the network we regularise over. If we regularise every level
of the network, the network will be overly constrained and
not change its classifier response.
That said, the method seems to be relatively robust to
choices of layer, and for VGGnet [42] we use the layers
{3, 8, 15, 22} in the batch normalised VGG192. For the
evaluating adversarial perturbation detection we use a stan-
dard CNN on CIFAR detailed in section 5.
A visual comparison of the results of minimising equa-
tions (3) and (4) can be seen in figure 2.
The objective is optimised using LBFGS[60], a standard
algorithm, well-suited for minimising these smooth non-
stochastic objectives. To guarantee that the perturbed im-
age lies within valid RGB values, we enforce consider two
sets of constraints (i) that the values do not exceed the range
observed in the original image, or (ii) within an `∞ based
-ball of the original image (used in the section on adversar-
ial perturbations in section 5), we simply clip the solution
found at each iteration to lie inside these bounds.
4 Perceptual Perturbations for Vi-
sual Explanations
Before describing our experimental overview, we give
a qualitative analysis of the perceptual perturbations, as
2To avoid ambiguity, our indexing treats each operation such as convo-
lution, ReLu or BatchNorm as a separate layer.
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Figure 4: A qualitative comparison of existing methods. See discussion in section 4.
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shown in figure 3. The found perturbations do a good job of
localising on a single object class, even in the presence of
highly textured or cluttered images (e.g. dragon fly on fern;
polar bear; coral reef), containing multiple classes (dog and
man; baseball and people; lawnmower). The perturbations
tend to focus upon the heads of the labelled class reflecting
the result of [15] that heads are more salient (llama; ele-
phant), but importantly it only finds heads of the explained
class salient, and not those belonging to other objects (e.g.
dog with leopard; dog with man; baseball; guitar). Much of
the confusion in localisation seems to occur in supporting
classes close behind the object - for example the human legs
behind the lawnmower are found to be salient as is the torso
of the man playing the guitar. This could be because these
classes frequently occur in close proximity to one another;
and provide supporting evidence for the detected class.
Following recent work [1] that points out that edge de-
tectors with no knowledge of the classifier do surprisingly
well in the insertion and deletion metrics used in visual ex-
plainablity, we instead focus on object localisation.
To transform our perceptual perturbations into a Saliency
Map, we simply treat the magnitude of the alteration in each
pixel as its salience. We evaluate the quality of our percep-
tual perturbations as explanations by using the localisation
protocol of [15, 57, 3]. We predicted a bounding box for the
most dominant object in the first 1000 Imagenet [37] vali-
dation images and employ simple threshold methods for fit-
ting bounding boxes. For the first approach, we follow [15]
in using a value-threshold where we normalise individual
heatmaps to be in the range of [0, 1], we then square-root
transform the saliency maps and grid search over the set of
thresholds α where 0 ≤ α ≤ 1 at intervals of size 0.05.
For the second experiment, we also follow [15] in using a
threshold scaled by the per image mean. Finally, we eval-
uate on a third measure based around percentage-threshold
where we consider the top k% most salient pixels.
As is standard, for each threshold, we extract the largest
connected component and draw a bounding box around it.
The object is assumed to be successfully localised when the
Intersection Over Union measure (IOU) between this box
and the ground truth is above 0.5. Following GradCAM’s
guided version[38], which makes use of image gradients
from [47], we consider a guided variant of our own con-
sisting of an element-wise multiplication between our per-
turbations and the normalised guided gradient of the image
x with respect to the margin Mi(x).
We compare our perceptual method and its guided
variant with GradCAM [38], Guided Backprop [47],
Guided GradCAM [38], SmoothGrad [43], Integrated Gra-
dient [49], Excitation Backprop [57], RISE [33] and Ex-
tremal Perturbations [14]. To demonstrate that the percep-
tual loss is important to the successful
A qualitative evaluation of the methods can be seen in
figure 3. These images were selected to be challenging – we
visualise a subset of those images where DeepFool’s adver-
sarial perturbation did not align with the object. For reasons
of space and fairness, we do not show DeepFool’s adversar-
ial perturbations in this figure. Compared with other visual
explanation techniques, our method highlights the interior
textures of the target object in the image. This differs to
gradient-based methods which captures finer edge details
such as SmoothGrad [43] and to activation-based methods
which highlights the entire object coarsely such as Grad-
CAM [38]. This is perhaps most clear with the panda image
where our method captures the interior texture of the Panda
rather than just its hard contours.
We compare the generated bounding box with the ground
truth bounding box. For the approaches [38, 43, 49, 57, 14],
we made use of the implementation developed for the paper
[14]3. For RISE[33] we made use of the authors publicly
available code4. For DeepFool we used the FoolBox Li-
brary provided by [34]5. We used default parameters for all
of the visual explanation methods on the validation images.
Method Value Percent Mean
GradCAM [38] 0.48 0.48 0.47
g-GradCAM[38] 0.50 0.48 0.46
Smooth Grad[43] 0.46 0.47 0.46
Integrated Grad[49] 0.44 0.49 0.44
Excitation[57] 0.49 0.46 0.45
Extremal[14] 0.54 0.52 0.53
Guided Backprop [47] 0.46 0.48 0.47
RISE[33] 0.57 0.58 0.58
DeepFool[29] 0.57 0.66 0.57
Us 0.48 0.46 0.46
Us Guided 0.43 0.46 0.46
Table 1: Error for value threshold, percentage threshold and
mean threshold. Lower is better.
We perform better than the tested approaches on object
localisation, obtaining the lowest error on value, and along
with Excitation back-prop [57], the lowest error on per-
cent based threshold, and the lowest error across all choices
of thresholding. We do noticeably less well on mean-
based thresholding, being beaten by two methods Excita-
tion Backprop [57], and Integrated Grad [49], and obtaining
similar score to several other approaches.
5 Detecting Perceptual Perturbations
To demonstrate that our adversarial perturbations have fun-
damentally different properties to existing approaches we
3https:__github.com_facebookresearch_TorchRay
4https:__github.com_eclique_RISE
5https:__github.com_bethgelab_foolbox
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Figure 5: Cone plots for each method. The greater the curvature, the easier it is to detect an adversarial perturbation using
[36]. Following [36] we take unperturbed images, with their respective adversarial perturbations generated by PGD, Mean,
CW, and our method. We plot the softmax assignment to the correct class of each of the methods in the space spanned
by the direction of the adversarial perturbation (y direction) and a randomly selected orthogonal direction of equal norm (x
direction). For M the original image, A the adversarial perturbation and T an orthogonal perturbation, we then sample the
space as follows. M + a(A −M) + bT , for a ∈ [−1,−0.95, ..., 2] and b ∈ [−1.5,−0.95, ..., 1.5]. The upper (green) dot
represents the location of the original image, while the lower (red) dot represents the location of the adversarial perturbation.
We average over 100 randomly selected CIFAR images from the test set and for each image and position in the space we
average over 5 random orthogonal directions. The logarithmic colour scales were selected for within plot clarity and vary
substantially between plots.
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demonstrate how recently published approach for detect-
ing adversarial perturbations fail to detect our approach. In
particular, we compare again the recently published detec-
tion method [36] that leverages changes induced by random
noise in the differences in the logits to uncover adversarial
perturbations.
This is a particularly relevant test for our approach, as the
defence by [36] is motivated by the notion that adversarial
perturbations found by minimising some p-norm distance
from the original image typically have different properties
to naturally occurring images. In contrast, our approach by
explicitly minimising a distance measure previously unused
in the literature on adversarial perturbations will produce
images that are closer to the distribution of real images ac-
cording to the perceptual distance, and may bypass these
tests that rely upon different properties.
The approach used by [36] is as follows: Given a train-
ing set, for each pair of classes a and b, they calculate statis-
tics describing how the difference between the classifier re-
sponse for the true class, and for another class changes with
injected noise. This must take into account the class de-
pendent nature of the distribution (see [36] for full details).
Using these quantities they construct a z-score between the
observed class of an image and every other class and con-
struct a classifier that estimates if an image is adversarial
based on the z-score deviating by more than a class defined
threshold.
They motivate this approach in several ways, one of
which is the ‘cone’ plot (see figure 5, in which they plot
the softmax of the target class over the space spanned by
the direction of the adversarial perturbation and that of ran-
domly selected orthogonal directions (see latter in this sec-
tion for a full explanation). The plot demonstrates that for
standard adversarial perturbations, unlike natural images,
moving in an orthogonal direction increases the probabil-
ity of the target class. As most random perturbations in
high-dimensional spaces are approximately orthogonal to
the direction of the adversarial perturbation, [36] suggested
evaluating the stability of the classifier response under ran-
dom noise.
Adversarial perturbation defences can only be expected
to work if the generated perturbations satisfy the expected
constraints, the so called threat model. As such, we form
our adverse perturbations by adding additional constraints
to those expected by [36] and for conformity, we restrict
our adversarial perturbations lie to an with an `∞ distance
of the original image of less than 8255.
To match the experimental setup in [36], in which the
adversaries are also restricted to 20 iterations of PGD [26],
we also restrict the number of iterations of LBFGS to match
the number of PGD iterations and we return the perturbation
with the best loss over the function evaluations.
We compare our results against several standard meth-
ods that are implemented in the package provided by [36]6,
namely, PGD [26] (projected gradient descent) PGD mean
(average PGD over noisy inputs) and CW [5] (Carlini Wag-
ner). The Carlini Wagner attack provided by the package
is the L2 attack, and does not restrict the `∞ norm of the
peturbations, although empirically it typically, but not al-
ways, has an `∞ of less than the limit of 8255.
Using the code provided by the authors of [36], we
make a direct comparison with their detection approach
on the CIFAR dataset with their default network, a pre-
trained7 batch-normalised network consisting of 7 convo-
lutional blocks. This network is used for all subsequent ex-
periments in this section. We arbitrary fix the 5th, 10th and
15th layer of this network, where following our convention
in section 3 we define a layer as any operation. We empha-
sise that this choice of layers was not tuned, and we did not
evaluate any other choices. The results can be seen in Ta-
ble 2. We outperform each of the other approaches, achiev-
ing a low detection rate of 14% with a similar level of clas-
sifier success as the other approaches. The performance of
PGD differs slightly from the values reported in [36], a brief
investigation appears to indicate that the method is sensi-
tive choice of noise, and the default parameters provided by
package may not be those used in the original paper.
A reproduction of the cone plot from [36], showcasing
the different structure of the different perturbation types can
be seen in figure 5. This figure plots the change in the soft-
max response of the target class against the direction of the
adversarial perturbation and that of a random orthogonal
perturbation (see figure caption for full implementation de-
tails).The cone-like structure described by [36] can be seen
for both PGD and the Mean method. However neither our
approach nor the CW perturbations have the same structure.
This may be related to the use of the `2 norm when gener-
ating the CW perturbations (the version provided as part
of [36] is the L2 version) which we also use in addition to
our perceptual loss components and matching the `∞ of the
threat model. As shown by table 2, our results are notice-
ably harder to detect with [36] only able to detect perceptual
perturbations 15% of the time vs. the detection rate for CW
being 57%.
6 Conclusion
We have presented a novel regularisation based on the per-
ceptual loss for the generation of adversarial perturbations.
This regularisation is designed to block the exploitation of
exploding gradients when generating adversarial perturba-
tions forcing larger and more meaningful perturbations to
6https:__github.com_yk_icml19_public
7https:__github.com_aaron-xichen_
pytorch-playground
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PGD Mean Ours CW
Clean Detection 0.0228 0.0224 0.024 0.0242
Attack Detection 0.7446 0.3275 0.1447 0.5658
Classifier Suc. % 0.0388 0.0399 0.0435 0.0431
Table 2: Comparison of the performance of our approach
and 3 approaches provided by the authors of [36] using the
default noise models. ‘Clean Detection’ gives the false pos-
itive rate of the classifier, and ‘Attack Detection’ the true
positive rate.
be generated. The fact that such perturbations still exist un-
der these constraints and remain imperceptible to humans
is another piece of the puzzle in understanding the inter-
relationship between adversarial perturbations, neural net-
works, and human vision.
We have shown how these perturbations can be inter-
preted as explanations and obtained state-of-the-art results
on a standard explainability benchmark. Moreover, the
properties of these novel perturbations means they are not
recent work.
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A Visual Explanation
We include a selection of the successful examples and the
failure cases from the visual explanation experiment on Im-
agenet [37]. We display the original image, the difference
between the perceptually perturbed and the original, the
saliency map, the dominant connected component with the
resulting bounding box and the dominant connected com-
ponent masked with the original image.
Figure 6 shows selected examples from our method
which failed in the explanation experiment. We note in
some failed cases, our method was able to localise on the
target object correctly. These cases can occur when the pre-
dicted bounding box is significantly larger or smaller than
the ground truth bounding box. This is apparent in row 3,
where the predicted bounding box is notably larger than the
ground truth localisation of the bighorn. Another common
failure is the occurrence of two objects in the scene where
the ground truth annotation is placed on one of the two ob-
jects. This is clearly visible in row 4 where there are two
porcupines in the same scene but only one of them is being
highlighted. There is also the case where the target object is
partially occluded from the scene such as the american alli-
gator in row 11, in this case the ground truth bounding box
includes part of the animal hidden behind the vegetation.
There are also examples where the predicted bounding box
has clearly localised on objects not within the target class.
One such example is in row 5, for which our method high-
lights both the tricycle and the two children in the scene.
Figure 7 shows selected examples from our method
which succeeded in the explanation experiment. Most of
the successful localised examples contain a single dominant
object in the scene. For example, the soup bowl in row 1, the
cougar in row 2 and the guenon in row 3. In some cases, the
method succeeds in localising the target object with a busy
background, e.g. the cabbage butterfly in row 5, the bee
eater in row 7 and the white wolf in row 11. The method
also achieves success in localising partial objects such as
the dugong in row 10.
B Adversarial Perturbations
For completeness, we present several examples using each
of the methods present in the main paper. We do not filter on
successful cases, and we select the examples to be recognis-
able and to highlight several classes. We display the results
in figure 8, where we present the original image, the ad-
versarially perturbed image, and the difference between the
two images rescaled to highlight the adversarial perturba-
tion.
Much like the results on Imagenet in the visual expla-
nations section we note that our perceptually perturbations
are localised on the object in question in all examples pre-
sented with the exception of row 6. The other PGD based
approaches (PGD and Mean) appear to localise less well,
although they do show localisation in row 3 and 4. Echo-
ing our discussion of the cone plot in the main body, the
L2 variant of CW also appears to localise well, at least on
CIFAR.
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Figure 6: Failure examples on Imagenet [37]. From left to right: (i) The original image; (ii) The difference between the
perceptually perturbed and the original; (iii) The saliency map; (iv) The dominant connected component and the resulting
bounding box in green and the ground truth in red; (v) The dominant connected component masked with the original image.
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Figure 7: Successful examples on Imagenet [37]. From left to right: (i) The original image; (ii) The difference between the
perceptually perturbed and the original; (iii) The saliency map; (iv) The dominant connected component and the resulting
bounding box in green and the ground truth in red; (v) The dominant connected component masked with the original image.
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Figure 8: Examples from CIFAR [23] from the adversarial perturbation experiments. From left to right: (i) The original
image; (ii) PGD perturbed image; (iii) PGD difference map; (iv) Mean perturbed image; (v) Mean difference map; (vi) CW
perturbed image; (vii) CW difference map; (viii) Our perturbed image; and (ix) Our difference map. Note each difference
map has been re-scaled to highlight the differences between regions and thus the colours are not directly comparable between
images.
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